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1 Motivation: Intention Reconsideration
The commonplace observation that agents—human and artificial alike—are subject to resource
bounds makes salient the possibility that an agent might have the capability to control its own rea-
soning and decision making abilities, to tune itself so that it has a better chance of spending time
thinking about the right things at the right times. The general study of metareasoning aims to under-
stand this “reasoning about reasoning” in the context of an agent that needs to budget its time and
resources in the optimal way, to achieve the best possible expected outcome.
Much of the work on metareasoning in AI has focused on discovering smart methods for focusing
an agent’s computational effort in the most useful ways, e.g., in the context of a hard search problem
[5, 4]. Meanwhile, much of the work in psychology has considered the very important issue of
strategy selection in problem solving and related tasks (see, e.g., [3] and references therein). Most
of this work views metareasoning through the lens of value of computation, an appropriation of the
notion of value of information, where the information-producing actions are internal computations
(this idea goes back to I.J. Good). The work we describe here also pursues this general line.
In this project we are interested in understanding a specific aspect of bounded optimality and metar-
easoning, namely the control of plan or intention reconsideration. This problem is more circum-
scribed than the general problem of metareasoning, but it also inherits many of the interesting and
characteristic features. The basic problem is as follows: Suppose an agent has devised a (partial)
plan of action for a particular environment, as it appeared to the agent at some time t. But then
at some later time t′ > t—perhaps in the course of executing the plan—the agent’s view on the
world changes. When should the agent replan, and when should the agent keep its current (perhaps
improvable, possibly dramatically) plan? In other words, in the specific context of a planning agent
who is learning new relevant facts about the world, when should this agent stop to rethink, and when
should it go ahead and act according to its current plan?
This problem was considered early on in philosophy (sometimes called “Hamlet’s Problem”), and
was then considered in AI as well (see, e.g., [1]). We would like to understand optimal solutions to
this problem, and in that direction, we have been investigating different metareasoning strategies—
that is, strategies for making the think/act decision in this specific context—and how they fare in
different classes of environments. The ultimate aim is to be able to determine, from the characteris-
tics of the environment, combined with what we know about the agent, what kind of intention/plan
reconsideration strategy will be (at least approximately) optimal. We are also ultimately interested
in meta-meta-level strategies, concerning how an agent might interpolate among meta-level recon-
sideration strategies given observed statistics of some novel environment.
Our work builds on earlier, largely forgotten (regrettably, in our view) work in the belief-desire-
intention (BDI) agent literature, by Kinny and Georgeff [2] (see also [6]). They compare some
rudimentary reconsideration strategies, as a function of several environmental parameters, in simple
Tileworld experiments. We reproduce their results, and also compare their reconsideration strategies
to the optimal reconsideration strategies for these environmental parameter settings.
In this abstract we first present a theoretical framework for the intention reconsideration problem
in MDPs, in the same spirit as much other work on metareasoning. This involves the construction
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of a meta-level MDP in which the two actions are ‘think’ or ‘act’. We then consider Kinny and
Georgeff’s framework as a special case, reproducing their results, and comparing their agents to an
“angelic” agent who decides optimally when to think or act. Interestingly, even the very simple
agents Kinny and Georgeff considered behave nearly optimally in certain environments. However,
no agent performs optimally across environments. Our results suggest that meta-meta-reasoning
may indeed be called for in this setting, so that an agent might tune its reconsideration strategy
flexibly to different environments.
2 Theoretical Framework
We formalize intention reconsideration as a metareasoning problem. At each time step, the agent
faces a choice between two meta-level actions: acting (i.e., executing the optimal action for the
current decision problem, based on the current plan) or deliberating (i.e., recomputing a new plan).
We assume that the agent’s environment is inherently dynamic, potentially changing at each time
step. As a result, some plan that may be optimal at a certain time may no longer be optimal, or
worse, may not be executable at a later time moment. We formalize the sequential decision problem
as an MDP (S,A, T,R), where S is a set of states, A is a set of actions, T : S ×A×S → [0, 1] is a
transition function, and R : S × A× S → R is a reward function. An agent’s view on the world is
captured by a scenario σ = (S,A, T,R, λ), where (S,A, T,R) is an MDP, and λ ∈ S is the agent’s
location in the MDP. At any given time the agent also maintains a policy, or plan, pi : S′ → A′ for
some set of states S′ and set of actions A′, which may or may not equal S and A. Thus, the domain
and range of the agent’s policy may not even coincide with the current set of states and actions.
We also assume an agent might have a memory store µ, which in the most general case simply
consists of all previous scenario/plan pairs: µ = 〈〈σ1, pi1〉, . . . , 〈σn−1, pin−1〉〉. (We will typically
be interested in agents with significantly less memory capacity.) Summarizing, an agent’s overall
state (σ, pi, µ) consists of a scenario σ, a plan pi, and a memory µ.
2.1 Meta-Level Actions: Think or Act
If the environment were static, then there would be no reason to revise a perfectly good plan.1 How-
ever, environments are of course rarely static. States may become unreachable, new states may
appear, and both utilities and probabilities may change. This raises the question of plan reconsider-
ation. We assume that at each time moment, an agent has a choice between two meta-level actions,
namely whether to act or to think (deliberate). When the agent decides to act, it will attempt the
optimal action according to the current plan. When the agent decides to think, it will recompute a
new plan based on the current MDP. The cost of deliberation can either be charged directly, or can
be captured indirectly by opportunity cost (missing out on potentially rewarding actions).
2.2 The Dynamics of the Environment
An environment specifies how a state s = 〈σ, pi, µ〉, and a choice of meta-decision α ∈ {think,act},
determine (in general stochastically, according to Pd and Pa) a new state s′ = 〈σ′, pi′, µ′〉:
〈σ, pi, µ〉 α−→ 〈σ′, pi′, µ′〉
• µ′ = 〈〈σ1, pi1〉, . . . , 〈σn−1, pin−1〉, 〈σ, pi〉〉;
• if α = think:
– σ′ is some perturbation of σ: σ′ ∼ Pd( · | σ).
– pi′ is a new policy for σ.
• if α = act:
– σ′ is a noisy result of taking action a = pi(λ): σ′ ∼ Pa( · | σ).
– pi′ = pi.
1Of course, there still might be a question of whether further thought might lead to a better plan in case the
current plan was itself selected heuristically or sub-optimally.
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Let S be the set of all possible environment states, which are the scenarios that we introduced in
the first subsection, and let A be the set of all possible actions. Let us assume we have specified
concrete perturbation functions Pd and Pa for a ∈ A. We can lift these to a general transition
function T : S × {think,act} × S → [0, 1], so that
T (s, α, s′) =

Pd(σ
′ | σ) if α = think and pi′ is the revised plan for σ
Ppi(λ)(σ
′ | σ) if α = act and pi′ = pi
0 otherwise
We can also lift the reward functions R over S to reward functionsR over S:
R(s, α, s′) =
{
R(λ, a, λ′) if α = act
0 if α = think,
where λ′ is the agent’s location in scenario σ′. This defines a new meta-level MDP as follows:
〈S, {think,act}, T ,R〉
Thus, once the set S and the function T are specified, we have a well defined MDP, whose space of
policies can be investigated just like any other MDP.
3 Experiments
Computing an optimal policy for the meta-level MDP is difficult in general. In this section, we
present experimental simulation results on specific classes of environments and agents. We have
implemented the general framework from the previous section in Java.2 While we have also been
investigating this general setting, in this abstract we focus on one set of experiments reproducing
the aforementioned Tileworld experiments by Kinny and Georgeff, with comparison to an “angelic”
metareasoner, who solves the think/act tradeoff approximately optimally.
3.1 Experimental Setup
Kinny and Georgeff present the Tileworld as a 2-dimensional grid on which the time between
two subsequent hole appearances is characterized by a gestation period g, and holes have a life-
expectancy l, both taken from a uniform distribution. Planning cost p is operationalized as a time
delay. The ratio of clock rates between the agent’s action capabilities and changes in the environ-
ment is set by a rate of world change parameter γ. This parameter determines the dynamism of the
world. When an agent plans, it selects the plan that maximizes hole score divided by distance (an
approximation to computing an optimal policy in this setting). The performance of an agent is char-
acterized by its effectiveness , which is its score divided by the maximum possible score it could
have achieved. The setup is easily seen as a specific case of our meta-decision problem (see Fig. 2).
Kinny and Georgeff propose two families of intention reconsideration strategies: bold agents, who
inflexibly replan after a fixed number of steps, and reactive agents, who respond to specific events in
the environment. For us, a bold agent only reconsiders its intentions when it has reached the target
hole; and a reactive agent is a bold agent that also replans when a hole closer than its current target
appears, or when its target disappears.
In addition, we consider an angelic agent, who approximates the value of computation calculations
that would allow always selecting think or act in an optimal way. It does so by recursively running
a large number of simulations for the meta-level actions from a given state, approximating the ex-
pected value of both, and choosing the better. Because we are interested in the theoretically best
policy, the angelic agent is not charged for any of this computation: time stops, and the agent can
spend as much time as it needs to determine the best meta-level action (hence the term ‘angelic’).
2The source code is available on Github: https://github.com/marcvanzee/
mdp-plan-revision. An example MDP visualization is depicted in Figure 1 of Appendix A.
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3.2 Results
Graphs of the results can be found in Appendix A. In Figure 3 we compare the bold agent with
the angelic planner with the same parameter settings as Kinny and Georgeff and a planning time
of 2. Unsurprisingly, the angelic planner outperforms the bold agent. In Figure 4, we increase the
planning time to 4, which increases the difference in performance between the angelic planner and
the bold agent, while the reactive planner does equally well. However, in Figure 5, we see that when
we change the parameters settings such that the world is significantly smaller and holes appear as
quickly as they come, the angelic planner outperforms the reactive agent as well. Finally, in Figure 6
we consider a highly dynamic domain in which holes appear and disappear very fast. Here the bold
agent outperforms the reactive strategy, and does nearly as well as the angelic agent. In such an
environment, agents that replan too often never have a chance to make it toward their goals.
Intriguingly, even these very simple agents—bold agents and rudimentary reactive agents—come
very close to ideal in certain environments. This suggests that if we fix a given environment, near-
optimal intention/plan reconsideration can actually be done quite tractably. However, since these
optimal meta-level strategies differ from environment to environment, this seems to be a natural
setting in which meta-meta-level reasoning can be useful. One would like a method for determining
which of a family of meta-level strategies one ought to use, given some (statistical or other) infor-
mation about the current environment, its dynamics and the relative (opportunity) cost of planning.
4 Summary and Outlook
We have formalized and implemented intention reconsideration strategies as a specific case of meta-
reasoning. We follow a long line of work in AI on this topic, where metareasoning is understood
as involving approximate calculations of value of computation. There are at least two distinctive
features of the work presented here. First, we focus on agents faced with the problem of whether
to reconsider a plan/intention. Second—and this is what makes the first point most interesting—we
focus on the interplay between different meta-level strategies for this problem and the dynamicity
of the environment, captured by parameter γ. We believe that this angle is both worthwhile and of
interest in itself, and that it may also lead to insights about the general metareasoning problem.
While the results presented here concern a rather specific case of the intention revision problem—
in the Tileworld, which is not necessarily representative of other domains—the general framework
concerns any sequential decision problem in a dynamic environment. Thus, in addition to exploring
the possibility of meta-meta-level strategies for this particular domain, we are also currently explor-
ing other settings, e.g., where states themselves may appear and disappear and probabilities may
change. We would like as comprehensive an understanding of the general relation between these
rational meta-level strategies and environmental parameters as possible, and we believe the results
here mark a good first step.
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A Figures
In this Appendix, we present some illustrations of our simulation environments, and present graphs
from some of our simulation results.
Figure 1: A simulated Markov Decision Process in our software. Red circles denote MDP states,
blues triangles denote Q-states, and green arrows denote the optimal policy computed using value
iteration. Rewards and probabilities are denotes respectively next to the states and arcs.
Figure 2: Tileworld representation in our software as an MDP (left), and in the more familiar Tile-
world format (right), omitting Q-states (since all probabilities are 1).
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Figure 3: Angelic planner vs Bold agent (p = 2). Following Kinny and Georgeff, we plot the rate
of the world change γ against the agent’s effectiveness , and we plot values of γ in log10.
Figure 4: Angelic planner vs Bold agent vs Reactive agent (p = 4). The rate of the world change γ
is plotted against the agent’s effectiveness .
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Figure 5: Angelic planner vs Reactive agent (p = 2, w = 5× 5, g = [10, 20], l = [10, 20]). The rate
of the world change γ is plotted against the agent’s effectiveness .
Figure 6: Angelic planner vs Bold agent vs Reactive agent (p = 2, w = 5× 5, g = [3, 5], l = [5, 8]).
The planning time p is plotted against the agent’s effectiveness .
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